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Abstract—In recent years, the widespread of mobile devices equipped with GPS and communication chips has led to the growing use
of location-based services (LBS) in which a user receives a service based on his current location. The disclosure of user’s location,
however, can raise serious concerns about user privacy in general, and location privacy in particular which led to the development of
various location privacy-preserving mechanisms aiming to enhance the location privacy while using LBS applications. In this paper, we
propose to model the user mobility pattern and utility of the LBS as a Markov decision process (MDP), and inspired by probabilistic
current state opacity notation, we introduce a new location privacy metric, namely −privacy, that quantifies the adversary belief over
the user’s current location. We exploit this dynamic model to design a LPPM that while it ensures the utility of service is being fully
utilized, independent of the adversary prior knowledge about the user, it can guarantee a user-specified privacy level can be achieved
for an infinite time horizon. The overall privacy-preserving framework, including the construction of the user mobility model as a MDP,
and design of the proposed LPPM, are demonstrated and validated with real-world experimental data.
Index Terms—location-based services, privacy, Markov decision process, inference attack, opacity.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A S a result of recent technological advances in sensing andtracking, and the widespread of mobile devices with signif-
icant computational and communication capabilities, the location-
based applications become increasingly popular. Example of LBS
applications in smartphones are mobile navigation, ride-sharing,
location-aware social networks, and location-based contextual
advertising, and dining recommendation.
Even though LBS are providing great benefits to the users,
the exposure of the user’s location raises major personal privacy
concerns. The LBS servers or third party systems receive and
store user location data could use them to infer user’s precise
location and track his point of interest, giving rise to a variety
of malicious activities [1]. Examples of these threats are tracking
threats: an adversary identifies user’s mobility pattern and predict
his future locations [2], identification threats: an adversary uses
user’s locations to infer his identity from an anatomized database
[3], and profiling threats: an adversary uses user’s location of
interest for profiling him in variety of sensitive information such
as political view and health condition [4].
Large body research has studied these privacy issues and
various privacy protection methods have developed to allow users
to utilize LBS while limiting the leakage of users’ confidential
information. These methods are known as location privacy pro-
tection mechanisms (LPPMs) that can be roughly divided into
two main classes: identity anonymization techniques and location
perturbation techniques [1]. Anonymization techniques protect
user privacy by dissociating the user’s real identity from his
location-based information. This usually is done by a third party
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anonymizer that replaces the identity of users with temporary
identifiers, namely pseudonyms [5]. However, it turns out that
merely removing or replacing user identity does not provide a
strong privacy since spatio-temporal characteristics of the data
can still help an adversary to track and re-identify the anonymous
users [6]. Thus, in addition to concealing users’ identity, it is also
important to obfuscate the users’ position.
Location obfuscation mechanisms protect users privacy by
deliberately degrading precision of users’ location information in
a way that the service can still be carried out to some acceptable
extent without revealing users’ true location [7]. Generally, this is
achieved by spatial obfuscation techniques such as adding some
noise [8], [9], using dummy locations [10], [11] or by spatial
cloaking that essentially enlarges the user’s queried region [12].
These methods offer location privacy by increasing the adver-
sary uncertainty about the user’s current position. However, often
a strong adversary has prior knowledge about the user’s movement
pattern and can strategically update her belief based on the user’s
service queries and eventually can reduce her uncertainty over the
user true locations [1], [13]. Therefore, in addition to concealing
and obfuscating the user’s current position, the LPPM should take
into account the adversary inference capability for the current and
future observations. Furthermore, the LPPMs proposed in these
methods typically assume the adversary prior knowledge does not
violate the user desired privacy level which may not be a valid
assumption if the adversary has accurate background knowledge
about the user’s behavior. For instance, a database derived from
social media applications shows that the user’s check-in locations
combined with other publicly available information such as the
popularity of these locations, can effectively be utilized by an
adversary to build an strong background knowledge about the user
mobility pattern [14].
To address these concerns, in this paper, we aim to provide a
model-based location privacy for a user who makes continuous
queries from the LBS server. Without loss of generality, we
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assume that the adversary is the LBS server who has knowledge
of the user mobility pattern but is not capable of observing the
user’s real-time true locations. We design a LPPM that offers all-
time privacy protection without having access to the adversary
prior knowledge, and furthermore, we show that even if the prior
knowledge does not meet the user-specified privacy level, the
LPPM can still deceive the adversary to eventually respect the
user’s privacy standard. Motivated by the event-driven nature of
the mobile user’s mobility model in LBS, we propose to use a
model-based location privacy-preserving framework. In particular,
we construct a Markov decision process that represents the user
mobility patterns and the LBS utility model. In order to character-
ize the user location privacy, we adapt the notion of probabilistic
current state opacity (CSO) that has been studied for the MDPs
and discrete event systems [15] and introduce a related new notion
called −privacy that captures the adversary uncertainty on the
user’s current location. In this setup, the user locations are the
MDP states, and therefore location privacy is protected if and only
if the constructed MDP meets the −privacy criteria.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent
section, we discuss the related works. Section 3 describes the pro-
cess of constructing a MDP representing the user mobility patterns
and the LBS utility model. Section 4 introduces the adversary
thread model, and −privacy metric, and furthermore studies the
limitation of other popular location privacy notations including
entropy, expected inference error, and differential privacy for
the localization attacks. Section 5 presents the location privacy-
preserving problem based on the proposed −privacy metric.
Sections 6 provides the LPPM design process and addresses its
computational complexity. Section 7 demonstrates applicability
of the proposed LPPM on an experimental dataset. The paper is
concluded in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORKS
Location privacy has been an active field of research over the past
decade and various LPPMs have been proposed to protect user
privacy. An early approach for preserving privacy is to replace the
identity of a user with a pseudonym [16]. Some other methods
propose to frequently change the pseudonyms when the users are
within areas called mix-zones [5]. However, these approaches may
fail in the context of LBS, since an adversary can de-anonymized
and re-identify the anonymous users by correlating his reported
location’s information and the user background information [6].
As a consequence, in addition to anonymizing users’ identities, the
users’ locations also should be perturbed before being supplied to
the LBS server.
A common technique to perturb users’ location is to reduce the
precision of the location information in the spatial and temporal
domains. This can often be achieved by cloaking techniques that
essentially reduce the granularity of the users’ information. The
k−anonymity privacy protection model is introduced based on
the cloaking technique [12], [17]. This method makes the users’
identity indistinguishable within a group of k − 1 other users that
are in the same spatial cloaking area. The k−anonymity privacy
condition, however, only helps on user query anonymity, that is
a private property to protect the association between users and
queries, while it does not prevent the disclosure of the link between
the user and his spatio-temporal data, namely location privacy.
Additionally, the k−anonymity privacy notation was shown to
be vulnerable to the presence of an adversary with certain prior
knowledge about users visiting locations [18].
Sometimes being indistinguishable from the other members of
a group is not sufficient to guarantee users privacy. For instance,
when the entire group has the same privacy concern for being in a
sensitive location that may leak their confidential information To
cope with this problem, some papers propose to provide location
privacy by making the user’s sensitive location indistinguishable
from other landmarks. [19] introduces a k−area cloaking mech-
anism that ensures a user’s sensitive location is concealed by
a region that covers at least k − 1 other sensitive areas. [20],
[21] proposes principle of location l−diversity. This mechanism
provides location privacy by ensuring the user query can be linked
to at least l semantically different location objects, such that each
of these has a probability 1/l to be the true one. These spatial
cloaking methods simply obfuscates the user sensitive location
into an uncertainty region, and therefore are bound to fail in the
presence of a strong adversary with inference capability. Such
an adversary with prior knowledge about the user’s location can
utilize the user’s queries to identify the user’s true location [1].
In contrast, in this paper, we aim to provide location privacy
independent of the adversary prior knowledge.
Differential privacy-based approaches protect user privacy
independent of the adversary prior knowledge by adding con-
trolled noise to the query outcome. [22] proposed to combine
differential privacy with k−anonymity. Following this work, [8],
[23] generalized the differential privacy with arbitrary metric
and developed a Planar Laplace mechanism to achieve −geo-
indistinguishability. In these approaches, the LPPM ensures loca-
tion privacy by restricting the adversary knowledge gain about the
true location. However, in presence of continues queries, when a
user releases the perturbed locations, he may not know how close
the adversarys estimate will get to his secret locations, despite the
differential privacy ensures that the relative gain of knowledge for
the adversary is bounded.
LPPMs based on distortion privacy address this issue [13].
These methods characterize user privacy based on the error of
inferring the users secret location from the reported location
information. This, however, requires an assumption of knowing
the adversary prior information and is not robust to the adversaries
with arbitrary prior knowledge [24].
Recently a model-based LPPM is introduced in [25]. This
work presents location privacy in the context of a formal method,
where the user mobility pattern is modeled by a deterministic dis-
crete event system with the state representing the user’s locations.
In this scheme, location privacy is characterized by current-state
opacity notation, and opacity enforcement technique is used to
guarantee the user location privacy. The proposed LPPM, however,
relies on an unrealistic security assumption that the user and the
adversary are behaving deterministically [26].
To address these issues, we propose to use a model-based
LPPM that characterizes the location privacy based on a Bayesian
adversary who has access to the user mobility model. Through
this setup, the LPPM can model the adversary inference dynamic
and track the adversary knowledge over the user secrete locations.
Furthermore, we drive the necessary and sufficient conditions over
the adversary inference dynamic that guarantees the user-defined
privacy level can be achieved. By incorporating this information
in the LPPM design, we develop a privacy-preserving mechanism
that randomizes the obfuscated reported locations such that the
adversary estimation of the user’s secret locations never violates
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the user-defined privacy requirement.
3 USER MOBILITY MODEL
We consider a mobile user who is required to share his location to
receive some information from the service providers. Due to the
user privacy concerns, the true locations of the user are required to
be kept private to the user, and noisy locations are released to the
service provider, which can be visible to an adversary. The adver-
sary, therefore, is assumed to have knowledge of all historically
released locations from the users, and hence can associate each
mobile user with a mathematical model representing his mobility
patterns. Examples are [27] and [28] that considered Markov
chain, and [29] that uses a hidden Markov chain to represent the
user mobility patterns.
In our LPPM framework, the users’ location correlations and
the quality of service are modeled by a MDP which is assumed
to be public and hence accessible by adversaries. In the following,
we will formally define MDP, and show how a user mobility
pattern can be represented by a MDP. In Section 7, we will further
illustrate this procedure based on a real-world dataset.
Definition 1. A Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple M =(S,A,T, p0, u) where S = {s1, . . . , sn} is a set of states, and
A = {a1, . . . , am} is a set of actions. T (s, a, s′) ∶ Prob [s′ ∣ s, a],
is the probability of transition from state s to s′ with action a ∈ A.
The initial state distribution is p0 ∶ S → [0,1]. Given s ∈ S, and
a ∈ A, the utility function is u(s, a) ∈ R. We denote the set of
available actions at state s by A(s).
We assume the MDP has a finite state space, finite action
space, and bounded reward function. Throughout the paper, we
often use T ass′ as shorthand of T (s, a, s′), ∑s as shorthand
for ∑s∈S , ∣S∣ as the cardinality of set S, and A − B as a set
difference. Let’s denote probability distribution over set S by
∆(S) = {p ∈ Rn ∣ ∑s p(s) = 1, p(s) ≥ 0,∀s ∈ S}, and we
call probability vector p ∈ ∆(S) has a uniform distribution, if
p(s) = 1/∣S∣ for all s ∈ S.
3.1 User Point of Interests
LBS often store users’ mobility traces that contain temporal and
spatial data of users’ visiting places. These location traces can
be used for statistical analyses to obtain users’ typical mobility
patterns and in particular to extract the users’ points of interest
(POIs), that the adversary can use to infer a variety of confidential
information about the user [4]. In this paper, we consider a Markov
decision process mobility model, where its states are the users’
POIs. Let’s denote a user POIs by a finite set S, where each s ∈ S
represents a predetermined spatial data of POIs.
Remark 1. To simplify the presentation, we define the state set
S only based on the user’s spatial information, however, it would
be easy to incorporate other information of user mobility patterns
such as timestamps. For instance, we can include timestamps tk, in
the state set as Sˆ = {(s, tk) ∣ s ∈ S, k ∈ N}, where N represents
a finite-time horizon.
3.2 Location Release Mechanism
Generally location obfuscation is achieved by spatial obfuscation
techniques such as using dummy locations [10], [11], spatial
cloaking [12], [30], or by adding noise [8], [9]. In our privacy pro-
tection framework, the location obfuscation mechanism for each
user’s POI can be seen as an action of reporting the obfuscated
position of that location. We therefore consider the MDP action set
A as a set of user’s obfuscated spatial information that are reported
to the LBS server and hence are observable to the adversary.
Remark 2. One of our objective here is to demonstrate, even if
each user’s POIs individually is protected by a location obfusca-
tion mechanism, an adversary can still use the user mobility model
to improve his estimation about user’s true location and perform
a localization attack.
3.3 Utility of Service
Inherently there is a utility loss associated with obfuscation mech-
anism. Here, we only require that the utility of service associated
with the selected location obfuscation mechanism can be modeled
as a real-valued and bounded MDP utility function u. In particular,
given a user’s POI s, and the a location obfuscation mechanism a,
u(s, a) characterizes the service quality loss of reporting a instead
of the exact location of s. For the sake of completeness, through
out the paper, we evaluate our privacy protection model using the
cloaking-region method [10].
3.4 User Mobility Model Illustration
In this section, we aim to illustrate the proposed MDP model
based on a student mobility pattern on the campus of Notre Dame
University. We consider a student with a mobile device moving
between the university libraries, and a LBS server that provides a
service to the student. Figure 1 shows the Notre Dame university
libraries map. We consider the libraries’ locations as the student
POIs and use the student movements to define the transition
between the POIs. Without loss of generality, we assume the
student uses the spatial cloaked region method [12] to obfuscate
his true locations. Regions A = {a, b, c, d, e, f} in the figure are
the cloaked regions that are precomputed by the anonymizer [12].
The student broadcasts the cloaked region associated with his
source location to the LBS server and transits to the next location.
Figure 1 shows the constructed MDP model for the user
mobility pattern. The states are the libraries’ locations and the
transition label shows the cloaking region information. The MDP
transition function represents the probability of selecting the
available cloaking regions at each POI. For instance, if the student
at state s uniformly selects a cloaking region a ∈ A(s), and moves
to the state s′, we define T (s, a, s′) = 1/∣A(s)∣. We assume the
user starts from Hesburgh library, labeled as 1 in the Figure 1,
that sets the initial state distribution as p0 = [1 0 0 0 0 0]T . The
quality loss function u depends on the application and area of
the cloaked region. In this example, the student is querying for
information in a specified area, and the obfuscation mechanism
blurs the user location by increasing the area of retrieval that
indicates the quality loss grows with the area of the cloaked
regions. Therefore, a quality loss metric for this setup can be
defined by u(s, a) = Area(a)Area(s) [31], where Area(.) is a function
that computes area of the specified region.
4 PRIVACY NOTATION
To evaluate an LPPM framework, it is important to define the
location privacy metric and the adversary threat model. In the fol-
lowing, we assume the user’s POIs contain confidential informa-
tion that should be protected from an adversary, and accordingly,
define the adversary threat model and the location privacy metric.
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Fig. 1. Left: Notre Dame university library map. The blue marked regions
are the university libraries, the student walking paths are marked with
black lines, and the spatial cloaking regions for each library are shown
with dashed line. Right: MDP user mobility model.
4.1 Adversary Inferece Model
We assume a LBS server is potentially an adversary who can have
access to the user’s mobility traces and other public information to
construct the user’s mobility model [13]. The perturbed location
are also reported to the LBS server than can be visible to the ad-
versary. Therefore, we consider an adversary who has a knowledge
of the user’s mobility model M , and is capable of observing the
reported perturbed locations A, however, the users’ true POIs or
the states S, are not observable to the adversary.
The adversary objective is to perform a localization attack that
is to infer the user presence at his POIs [13]. In the localization
attacks, the adversary obtains users obfuscated locations that are
generated probabilistically by the LPPM. Since for any observed
obfuscated location a ∈ A, there are potentially many user’s
POIs that may have produced a, the outcome of the adversary
localization attack is a probability distribution over the user true
POIs [13]. Formally, given an observation a ∈ A, the adversary
outcome for any s ∈ S is in the form of a posterior distribution
Prob [s ∣ a]. We call this posterior distribution the adversary belief
and we denote it by b that is a function b ∶ S → [0,1], such
that ∑s b(s) = 1. Furthermore, the adversary can have some
background knowledge about users’ mobility habit before starting
his observation. This side knowledge also can be encoded as a
probability distribution over the state set [4] that is defined by
b0 ∶ S → [0,1], such that ∑s b0(s) = 1.
The adversary initially at t = 0, has a prior belief b0, and
at each time instant t, when a set of perturbed locations A are
observed, the adversary updates its belief with Bayes rule by
computing its posterior distribution, given by:
bt+1(q′ ∣ A) = ∑
a∈Apat ∑q∈S T (q, a, q′)bt(q), (1)
where, pat = Prob [at = a] is the probability of a at time t.
4.2 Overview of Related Privacy Notations and Their
Limitations
Given the adversary threat model, LPPMs are designed and being
evaluated based on an assumed location-privacy metric. Selection
of an effective privacy metric however, highly depends on the
specification of the user’s location privacy requirement. Here, we
first provide an overview of related location privacy notations to
motivate our proposed privacy metric. For a comprehensive review
of the privacy metrics, see [32].
Throughout this section, we will be using the user mobility
model in Figure 1 as a running example. We use the adversary
inference model in (1), and assume its prior belief b0, is a uniform
distribution. As it is mentioned earlier, we consider an adversary
with a localization attack model, and therefore, we focus on related
privacy metrics that measure user’s presents-absence disclosure to
an adversary. Note that, we will not evaluate the utility of service
associated with these privacy metrics since our objective here is to
only study the limitation of these metrics to capture the outcome
of the adversary localization attacks.
Let’s assume the state s4 is the user’s secrete area and it is
critical to ensure the adversary can not determine the user presence
at this area. We denote the user’s secrete POIs by Ss = {s4}.
We furthermore consider the user’s LPPM as an obfuscation
mechanism f ∶ S → ∆(A) that determines the random mapping
between the user’s actual POIs S, and the cloaked regions A.
Note that, we assume the adversary can accurately measure the
probability distribution of any obfuscated location a, and hence,
we set pa = ∑s p(s)f(a∣s) in the adversary inference model (1).
4.2.1 Entropy
A common approach to define the user location privacy is to use
entropy to quantity the adversary localization attack’s outcome
[33]. Entropy quantifies the uncertainty associated with predicting
the value of a random variable. In the location privacy, it can
be interpreted as how well the adversary can determine the
user’s position among other possible locations. More specifically,
entropy of the adversary belief b, is defined by:
H(S) =∑
s
b(s) log(1/b(s)). (2)
The maximum adversary uncertainty is when b is a uniform
distribution that implies, the higher entropy is, the lower certainty
for the attack’s outcome. The absolute value of entropy however
does not necessarily indicates how accurate the adversary attack’s
outcome is. For instance, an adversary can identify the user
current location with high probability, but the remaining low
probability of other possible locations still results a high value of
entropy [34]. To further illustrate this limitation, we compute the
obfuscation mechanism f that maximizes the adversary entropy
H(S). Formally,
max
ft
Ht(S) t ≥ 1. (3)
where Ht(S) = ∑s bt(s) log(1/bt(s)). Figure 2 demonstrates
the adversary entropy over the user’s POIs S, and the adversary
belief over the user’s secrete location s4. As the figure illustrates,
although the absolute value of H(S) did not change drastically,
the adversary becomes significantly more confident about the user
presence at s4. Note that, for the MDP in Figure 1, the maximum
adversary entropy is log(∣S∣) = 1.79. The slight reduction of
H(S) is due to the constraints imposed by the user’s mobility
model on the obfuscation mechanism f .
4.2.2 Inference Error
Privacy metrics based on expected inference error are widely used
to characterize location privacy [13]. These approaches quantify
how close the attacks outcome is to the true user’s locations. Given
the attack’s outcome b, this privacy metric is defined by:
ExpErr = min
sˆ
∑
s∈S b(s)dq(s, sˆ), (4)
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Fig. 2. The entropy of the adversary belief
in (3). The left vertical axis represents entropy
of the adversary posterior, and the right one is
the adversary belief over the user secret area
Ss.
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Fig. 3. The adversary expected inference er-
ror (5). The left vertical axis represents the min-
imum expected adversary inference error, and
the right one is the adversary belief over the user
secret area Ss.
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Fig. 4. Adversary belief with (D, )−privacy
condition (7). The dashed line is the(D, )−privacy upper bound e. The left
vertical axis represents Dt for Ss, and the right
one is the adversary belief over Ss.
where dq(.) can be Hamming distance or Euclidean distance
between sˆ and s, or any other metric that captures the privacy
loss. Here, sˆ is the estimated user’s location, and s is the user’s true
location. In this privacy metric, the high estimation error correlates
with low location privacy, which indicates the adversary objective
is to minimize the expected error of any attack’s outcome. The
objective LPPM for this setup is to maximize the adversary
inference error given the user constraint on the service quality
loss [35]. This privacy metric defines user privacy as a global
performance metric that is averaged over all locations. Hence, this
metric does not explicitly characterize the the user privacy at a
certain location which can be critical for the localization attacks.
Similarly, we design an LPPM to illustrate this limitation. Let’s
consider dq(s, sˆ) as a Euclidean distance between centroid of area
s and s′. We compute the following obfuscation mechanism that
maximizes (4) for t ≥ 1:
ExpErrt = max
ft
min
s
∑ˆ
s∈S bt(sˆ)dq(sˆ, s). (5)
Figure 3 demonstrates how the expected inference error has
evolved with respect to the adversary belief over the user secret
location bt(s4). As the simulation result is illustrated, the LPPM
could maintain the expected inference error of the adversary close
to the initial error, but bt(s4) has increased over time that indicates
the adversary becomes more certain about the user presence at s4.
4.2.3 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a rigorous mathematical framework that
provides a provable privacy guarantee to protect individual data
in a database. This is achieved by adding controlled noise to
the query outcome such that, the presence (or absence) of an
individual in the database will have a negligible impact on the
perturbed reported answer. Differential privacy techniques have
been used in the context of LBS by considering the user’s location
as the sensitive information and using the location obfuscation
mechanisms to produce the query noise. These obfuscation mech-
anisms are designed such that changing from one location to
another nearby location makes the probability distribution of the
reported locations to only change to a certain extent [9].
Depending on the exact notion of indistinguishability between
the user’s locations, several differential privacy models have
been introduced. In −geo-indistinguishability models [8], the
indistinguishably between two adjacent locations proportionally
increases with the distance between them. Formally, the obfusca-
tion mechanism f satisfies −geo-indistinguishability if f(a∣s)/
f(a∣s′) ≤ exp (dq(s, s′)). This property means, the (log of) the
ratio between the probability of reporting the obfuscated location
a, at any pair of user’s locations, is always bounded by dq .
Another popular model based on the differential privacy is(D, )−location privacy [9]. In this model, indistinguishably is
defined for any arbitrary locations within a distance of a prede-
fined value D. Formally, (D, )−location privacy holds for the
mechanism f if f(a∣s)/f(a∣s′) ≤ exp() for all s, s′ ∈ S such
that dq(s, s′) ≤ D. This characterization implies the (log of)
the ratio of between the probability of reporting the perturbed
location a in any two adjacent locations is at most . These two
privacy notation are correlated [9], and have been extended to
characterize other type of location indistinguishably [1]. However,
our objective here is to evaluate the differential-privacy based
metrics for the described localization attack. Therefore, for the
sake of simplicity and clarity, we focus our analysis on the specific
model of (D, )−privacy. Particularly, we select D such that
dq(s, s′) ≤ D holds for any pair of states s, s′ ∈ S. Differential
privacy in general and (D, )−privacy, in particular, are solely
described by the obfuscation mechanism, and hence, they can
guarantee the user privacy independent of the adversary prior
knowledge. However, [9] has shown that it might not be possible to
achieve (D, )−privacy for any adversary prior knowledge while
receiving a reasonable quality of service. Therefore, it is important
to characterize (D, )−privacy as the adversary knowledge gain.
More precisely, let’s consider bt+1 as the adversary posterior and
bt as the prior belief. The obfuscation mechanism f satisfies(D, )−privacy at time t, if and if the adversary posterior and
prior belief satisfy [9]:
bt+1(s)
bt+1(s′) ≤ e bt(s)bt(s′) ∀s, s′ ∈ S. (6)
As (6) implies, (D, )−privacy provides location privacy by re-
stricting the relative gain of the adversary knowledge about the
user’s true location. However, this model may not be able to
quantify how close the adversary belief gets to the user’s true
location over time. We illustrate this limitation through the student
mobility model in Figure 1. For any s, s′ ∈ S, and time t, let’s
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rewrite (6) as:
Dt(s, s′) = bt+1(s)bt(s′)
bt+1(s′)bt(s) ≤ e, (7)
where bt+1 can be obtained from the adversary inference
model (1). we set  = 0.7, and find f that makes the adversary
belief bt+1, to satisfy (7) at any time t. Figure 4 demonstrates howDt evolves for the secrete location s4. As it is depicted in the
figure, the relative adversary knowledge gain over s4, captured
by Dt(s4, s) for any s ∈ {S − s4}, meets the (D, )−privacy
criteria (7). However, the absolute value of the adversary belief
over the secrete location, bt(s4), is kept increasing over time.
Hence, although the relative adversary knowledge gain is upper
bounded by e, and is safe in a sense of (D, )−privacy, the
adversary can still combine the reported obfuscated locations and
the user mobility model to further improve his knowledge about
the user secrete location.
Roughly speaking, the underlying limitation of these metrics
to capture the adversary knowledge over a certain location relies
on quantifying the privacy based on the location indistinguishably.
Motivated by probabilistic current state opacity (CSO) metric [15],
we propose to define the user location privacy as the absolute value
of the adversary belief over the user’s secrete area.
4.3 Location Privacy in Belief Space
To quantify the level of protection offered by an LPPM against
the adversary, we propose to use a probabilistic current state
opacity metric (CSO). In the CSO framework, the goal is to
protect the system states that contain sensitive information, namely
secret states, against an external observer or an adversary [15].
The adversary maintains a belief over the system secrets through
Bayesian inference, and the system is considered CSO safe if the
adversary confidence that a secret has been observed is bounded.
In the LPPM framework, in analogs to secret states, the users
may only need to protect a subset of POIs which contains users
semantic information that can be used by an adversary for profiling
or other attacks. Examples include health clinics, places with reli-
gious significance, etc. [4]. Therefore, we propose to use the CSO
definition to quantify users’ POIs privacy against an adversary
with the intention of localization attack. Formally, suppose there
is a subset of states in the MDP M , representing sensitive POIs
of a user, Ss ⊂ S, that LPPM would like to conceal from the
adversary. Note that, for Ss = S, the problem is trivial.
Our CSO inspired location privacy metric is required that the
adversary belief of M being in the secrete states Ss, is upper
bounded by a constant  ∈ [0,1]. We denote this privacy notation
as a −privacy and formalize it in the following definition.
Definition 2. Given user mobility pattern modeled by a MDP
M = (S,A,T, p0, u), set of secrete POIs, Ss ⊂ S, and  > 0, M
is −private under privacy-preserving policy µ, if
∑
s∈Ss bt(s) ≤  t > 0. (8)
This notation of privacy characterizes inference evaluation of
the adversary observation over the user’s current true location for
all time. In this setup, the location privacy of the user is preserved
if the adversary confident is lower than some desired threshold.
Note that, in general, we cannot prevent the adversary from having
prior information about the user’s mobility pattern, and therefore
we assume the system M is -private at t = 0. However, our goal
is to control the additional information that the adversary obtains
by observing the released location information by the user.
5 LOCATION-PRIVACY PROTECTION PROBLEM
In our framework, the user location protection mechanism against
the adversary localization attack is based on the randomization
of the obfuscation mechanisms that is provided by a privacy-
preserving policy.
5.1 Privacy-preserving Policy
A stationary stochastic privacy-preserving is a function µ ∶ S ×
A→ [0,1], that assigns a probability distribution over the actions
of each state s ∈ S. We denote the policy decision matrix as
µ ∈ Rn,m, where each element of µ in sth row and ath column
is defined by µ(s, a). MDP M is said to follow a policy µ, if for
any state s, it draws an action a from µ. Therefore, for any s ∈ S,
and a ∈ A, we have µ(s, a) = Prob [a ∣ s]. Note that µ induces a
Markov chain (MC) MC = (S,Mµ, p0) [36] with transition matrix
Mµ ∈ Rn,n, where its elements for any s, s′ ∈ S are:
Mµ(s, s′) = ∑
a∈Aµ(s, a)T (s, a, s′). (9)
Let T a ∈ Rn,n be a row stochastic matrix having elements
T (s, a, s′) for any s, s′ ∈ S. The induced MC transition matrix
Mµ in (9), can be written as [37]:
Mµ = ∑
a∈AT
a ⊙ ((µea)1T ) , (10)
where 1 is a column vector of all ones, ea is a vector with the ath
element as 1 and the rest are all zeroes, and ⊙ is a element-wise
Hadamard product. For each state s ∈ S, let’s denote pt(s) =
Prob [st = s] as the probability of the system being at state s at
time t, and let pt ∈ Rn be the vector of pt(s) for all s ∈ S.
The state probability distribution of MC evolves according to the
following dynamic equation:
pt+1 =MTµ pt. (11)
Remark 3. Considering stationary privacy-preserving policy,
helps the LPPM to avoid recomputing the policy for every change
of the adversary knowledge that dramatically reduces the compu-
tational overhead on the user’s mobile device.
When the policy µ is stationary, the induced MC transition ma-
trix, Mµ, is time-independent. For finite state MC with transition
matrix Mµ, the stationary distribution, p∞, is a row probability
vector satisfying:
p∞ =Mµp∞, (12)
that implies if after some time t′, pt′ = p∞, then for all t′ ≥ t,
we have pt′ = p∞. Mµ is called ergodic, if there exists a unique
invariant and strictly positive stationary distribution p∞, such that
independent of the initial distribution, p0, the state probability
distribution, pt, converges to p∞, i.e., limt→∞ pt = p∞ [36, §8.3].
Definition 3. A MDP M is called unichain, if for each policy µ,
the Markov chain induced by µ is ergodic [36].
Here, we assume the MDP M representing the user mobility
pattern is a unichain MDP. This indicates that for any policy µ,
the induced MC, Mµ, has a single recurrent class plus a possibly
empty set of transient states (see [36, §8.3] for an elementary
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exposition of classification of MDP). A recurrent state in the user
mobility model is translated as a user POI s, which is accessible
from all the POIs that are, in turn, accessible from the s. Therefore,
restricting Mµ to a single recurrent class of POIs, implies the user
can travel to any POI from any other POIs which we believe is not
a restrictive assumption on the user mobility model.
5.2 Performance Metrics
Performance metric measures overall efficiency of the framework
for a given LPPM and quality loss model. When the privacy
preserving policy frequently makes a decision in a long-run, it
might be more preferable to compare LPPMs on the basis of
their average expected quality loss. We therefore consider average
quality loss criterion as as a performance metric [36]. Formally,
for any stationary policy µ, and initial distribution p0, the expected
total quality loss is defined as follows:
vµ = lim
N→∞ 1N Eµp0 [ N∑t=1u(st, at)] , (13)
This expression may be undefined when the limit does not exist,
however it known that for unichain MDP, the existence of this limit
is guaranteed [36, §8.2]. Here, LPPM objective is to minimize the
overall quality loss while the user privacy is preserved according
to the privacy condition (8).
5.3 Problem Formulation
One the objective of the LPPM is to find an optimal privacy-
preserving policy µ∗ that minimizes vµ. Formally, v∗µ = minµ vµ,
and the optimal privacy-preserving policy is µ∗ = arg minµ vµ.
If there is no constraint on the states and actions, this problem
becomes a well-studied unconstrained MDP planning, and it can
be solved by value-iteration algorithms [36]. However, here we
have location privacy constraints that have to be considered in
the policy synthesis. The problem of privacy-preserving optimal
policy synthesis is given below.
Problem 1. Given a unichain MDP M = (S,A,T, p0, u) with
average total quality loss criterion vµ, synthesize an optimal
privacy-preserving policy µ that minimizes vµ, and ensures M
is −private for t ≥ 0.
6 OPTIMAL PRIVACY-PRESERVING POLICY SYN-
THESIS
In this section, we study the design of privacy-preserving op-
timal policy for Problem 1. Our underlying idea is to formu-
late the policy synthesis problem into a linear programming
(LP) problem. Given a MDP M controlled by the policy µ,
the average quality loss metric (13) can be defined by vµ =∑s,a µ(s, a)p∞(s)u(s, a) [36, §8.4], where p∞ is the unique
stationary distribution of Mµ. Let’s denote joint state-action dis-
tribution as θ(s, a) = p∞(s)µ(s, a), and in a matrix form, by
θ ∈ Rn,m, where ∑s,a θ(s, a) = 1. The expected total quality loss
metric (13) then can be re-written as:
vµ =∑
s,a
θ(s, a)u(s, a), (14)
which is a linear function of θ [36, §8.4]. The stationary distribu-
tion requirement (11) for Mµ similarly can be driven based on θ,
defined by:∑
a
θ(s′, a) =∑
s,a
θ(s′, a)T (s, a, s′), ∀s′ ∈ S. (15)
The adversary belief also can be modeled as function of
state-action distribution θ. We considered an adversary who has
access to the history of released user’s locations, and there-
fore estimates the distribution of the observed actions as pˆat =∑s µ(st, at)p(st). The adversary then updates its belief for any
state q′ ∈ S, based on a Bayesian rule [38], that is defined by the
following equation:
bt+1(q′ ∣ A) = ∑
a∈A∑s∈S∑q∈S pt(s)µ(s, a)T (q, a, q′)bt(q). (16)
However, since we consider a stationary policy µ, the user
released locations are solely the function of the user’s POIs,
and therefore the adversary estimation of pt(a) in (1), de-
noted by pˆ(a), is time independent. Hence, we have pˆ(a) =∑s p∞(s)µ(s, a), that makes the adversary update dynamic
model to take the following form:
bt+1(q′ ∣ A) = ∑
a∈A∑s∈S∑q∈S θ(s, a)T (q, a, q′)bt(q). (17)
Let’s bt ∈ Rn be the vector of adversary belief over state set S
at time instant t. The adversary belief bt can be seen as a state
probability distribution of a MC with a dynamic expressed in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The adversary belief bt evolves according to the
following MC dynamic:
bt+1 =MTadvbt, t = 0,1, . . . (18)
where the adversary transition matrix is
Madv =∑
a
T a ⊙ ((1T θea)11T ) . (19)
Proof. For all q, q′ ∈ S, let’s define the elements of Madv as:
Madv(q, q′) =∑
a
T aqq′ ⊙ ((1T θ(q, a)ea)11T ) ,
then (18) follows from definition of bt+1 given in (17).
Furthermore, all the elements of Madv are non-zero, and∑q′Madv(q, q′) = 1, and therefore Madv is a stochastic matrix
and hence (18) is a Markov chain model.
In order to enforce the −privacy requirement on M with
stationary policy µ, we first find the necessary and sufficient
conditions that makes M to be −private. Let’s denote 0 as a zero
matrix of appropriate dimension, and β > (≥)G as βi,j > (≥)Gi,j
for all i, j elements of matrices β, and G.
Theorem 1. For every b0 satisfying Asb0 ≤ , M is −private
under policy µ for t ≥ 0, if and if there exists z ∈ R and β ∈ R1,n
such that:− 1T z +Asz −AsMTadv − β ≥ −1T , β ≥ 0, z ≥ 0. (20)
Proof. We first find the necessary and suffocate conditions on
Madv that ensures if Asb0 ≤ , then Asbt ≤  for all t > 0.
This requirement can be written as:
max
b∈∆(S),Asb≤AsMTadvb ≤ . (21)
This condition implies that any prior belief b that respects the
−privacy condition, it makes the posterior belief to satisfy the
−privacy requirement. In a standard form, it can be written as:
min
b
c ⋅ b, s.t. Aˆsb ≥ d, b ≥ 0, (22)
PREPRINT. UNDER REVIEW. 8
where c = −AsMTadv , d = [− −1 1]T , and Aˆs =[−ATs −1 1]T . In order to evaluate the feasibility of prime
optimization problems, let’s first introduce slack variable λ ≥ 0 as
Asb+λ = . Since  > 0, then we can always find b ≥ 0, and λ ≥ 0
such that 1T b = 1,Asb + λ = , has a solution. Hence, the prime
optimization problem is feasible, and dual of this optimization
problem takes the form:
max
z,y
−z − y1 + y2 (23)
s.t. −Asz − 1T y1 + 1T y2 ≤ −AsMTadv,
z, y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0.
In a similar way, let’s denote slack variable β ∈ R1,n, β ≥ 0
that results:−Asz − 1T y1 + 1T y2 +AsMTadv + β = 0. (24)
It is clear that the quality constraints has a solution for β ≥ 0,
and z, y1, y2 ≥ 0 that implies the strong duality holds, i.e.,−AsMadvb = −z − y1 + y2. Let’s denote y = y2 − y1, then from
equality condition (24), we have 1T y = Asz −AsMTadv − β, that
implies dual of the optimization takes the form:
max
z,y,β
−z + y (25)
s.t. 1T y = Asz −AsMTadv − β, (26)
β ≥ 0, z ≥ 0, y unconstrained.
This is equivalent to set of LP problems, given by:
max
z≥0,β≥0 [−1T z +Asz −AsMTadv − β] ei, (27)
where ei is a vector with the ith element as 1 and the rest are
all zeroes, and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Here by equivalent we mean if
there exists a feasible solution that maximizes (25), that must
also maximize all the linear programming problems in (27). Note
that (27) is obtained by multiplying 1T to (25), and substituting
1T y with (26). Since strong duality holds and duality gap is zero,
the necessary and sufficient condition is using the LP problem
expressed in (21). Hence the optimal solution of (27) must satisfy:− 1T z +Asz −AsMTadv − β ≥ −1T , β ≥ 0, z ≥ 0. (28)
Therefore, if there exists β ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 satisfying (28), that
must be the solution of dual problem (27), and since strong duality
holds, it is the solution of (21) that guarantees Asbt ≤  for t > 0,
and hence M is −private . Note that, a partially similar scheme
of the proof was used by [39] for the safety control Markov Chain.
Here, we have polytopic constraints which is a different problem
formulation from [39]. This proves the necessary and sufficient
conditions.
Inequality (20) characterizes a condition over Madv that if
satisfies implies: if MDP M is initially −private at t = 0, it stays
−private forever. We encode this condition as a constraint over
policy µ in linear programming that minimize the average quality
loss metric vµ given in (14). The following LP solves Problem 1.
min
θ,Madv
vµ (29)
s.t. (20), (19), (15),∑
s,a
θ(s, a) = 1, θ ≥ 0.
Note that, we have redefined our objective function vµ, and the
adversary inference modelMadv based on the state-action variable
θ. If θ∗ is an optimal solution that minimizes (29), then for any
s ∈ S, and a ∈ A, it induces a stationary state distribution p∗∞(s) =∑a θ∗(s, a), and a stationary optimal policy given by µ∗(s, a) =
θ∗(s, a)/p∗∞(s).
Remark 4. Our privacy protection framework is designed for
an individual mobile user, and the privacy-preserving policy is
designed to be performed at the users mobile device without
the collaboration of a trusted third party or other users. This
property of our framework is an important advantage compared
to other types of solutions that rely on the intervention of a trusted
centralized service, such as spatial k−anonymity [12].
6.1 LPPM with unsafe adversary prior belief
To this end, we have assumed the adversary prior belief over the
secrete user’s POIs, does not violate the location privacy, i.e.,
Asb0 ≤ . This assumption may not be valid if the adversary has
a strong background knowledge about the user mobility model,
or the LPPM designer selects a tight upper bound over adversary
belief that makes b0 unsafe [40]. Here, we aim to design a LPPM
that drives the adversary belief to a −private region even if her
prior belief does not meet the −privacy criteria.
Our LPPM design process for this setup relies on the in-
variant property of ergodic Markov chain that guarantees the
state probability distribution converges to a stationary distribution
independent of the initial distribution of the states. Hence, if the
adversary inference model is an ergodic MC, it guarantees the
adversary belief over the user’s secrete POIs, will converge to
a unique stationary distribution. The LPPM objective then is to
force the adversary belief to converge to a stationary distribution
that respects −privacy requirement.
Lemma 2. If MDP M is unichain, then for any policy µ, and any
stationary distribution p∞, respecting (11), Madv is an ergodic
Markov chain.
Proof. Let’s consider a stationary policy µ˜, and denote µ˜(a) =∑s p∞(s)µ(s, a) for all a ∈ A. The adversary inference
model (17), can be written as bt+1 = ∑a µ˜(a)T abt, that implies
Madv = ∑a µ˜(a)T a. This model captures a MDP with transition
matrix T , with a stationary stochastic policy µ˜ that is state
independent, i.e., µ˜(s, a) = µ˜(a) for all s ∈ S. Hence, since T
is transition function of the unichain MDP M , according to the
Definition 3, the policy µ˜, must induce an ergodic Markov chain
with transition matrix Madv .
Subsequently, for the adversary inference model (17), there
exists a unique stationary distribution b∞ ∈ Rn, satisfying:
b∞ =Madvb∞, (30)
and limt→∞ bt = b∞, independent of b0. We define asymptotic
location privacy based on the adversary stationary belief given in
below.
Definition 4. Given user a mobility pattern modeled by a unichain
MDP M = (S,A,T, p0, u), and a set of secrete POIs, Ss ⊂ S, M
is asymptotically −private under policy µ, if
lim
t→∞ ∑
s∈Ss bt(s) ≤ . (31)
Due to ergodic property of Madv , asymptotic −privacy
requirement (31) can be simply written as Asb∞ ≤ . This
requirement characterizes a region in the adversary belief space
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that the user’s secrete POIs are considered safe. Therefore, even if
the adversary prior belief is not in this region, i.e., Asb0 ≰ , the
LPPM can still attempt to achieve asymptotic −privacy require-
ment (31), by designing a policy µ that drives the adversary belief
bt to eventually reaches asymptotic −private region, Asb∞ ≤ ,
and stays there. Formally, policy µ can enforce user mobility
model M to be asymptotically −private, if there exist a stationary
distribution p∞ satisfying (11), and the following set is not empty.
Ωb∞(θ) = {b∞ ∈ Rn ∣ b∞ ∈ ∆(S), (32)
b∞Madv = b∞,AsbT∞ ≤ }.
In this setup, in order to minimize the average quality loss vµ,
we design an optimization problem with objective function (14),
and consider (32) as a constraint. The main challenge, however, is
the bilinear form of (30) over b∞ and θ, that makes the problem
non-convex. Formally:
min
θ,Madv,b∞ vµ (33)
s.t. (32), (19), (15),∑
s,a
θ(s, a) = 1, θ ≥ 0.
Similarly, if θ∗ is the optimal solution of (33), then for any s ∈ S,
and a ∈ A, it induces p∗∞(s) = ∑a θ∗(s, a), and the optimal
stationary policy µ∗(s, a) = θ∗(s, a)/p∗∞(s).
6.2 Computation Overhead
The proposed LPPM framework designs the privacy-preserving
policies based on the linear programming (29), where the dimen-
sion of the problem is defined based on the number of optimiza-
tion variables, d, and the number of constraints l. In (29), the
constraints (20) and (19) can be merged into a single inequality.
Therefore, we have l = ∣S∣ × ∣A∣ + 2∣S∣ + 1 constraints, and
d = ∣S∣×∣A∣+∣S∣+1 optimization variables. The most common tool
in practice to solve linear programming is simplex algorithms that
is quite efficient. In particular, the number of iterations seemed
polynomial in d and l [41], but the worst-case complexity is
proven to be exponential [42].
The asymptotic privacy-preserving synthesis problem (33) is
a bilinear matrix inequality (BMI) optimization problem. It is
proven that a general BMI constrained optimization problem is
NP-hard, but despite this theoretical barrier, various approaches
have been developed in the literature to tackle these optimization
problems. BMI optimization problems can be solved by forming
a sequence of semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxations [43],
or with other general nonlinear optimization methods such as
sequential quadratic programming (SQP) [44].
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we study effectiveness of the proposed LPPM on a
realistic case study involving publicly available data. Particularly,
we select Geolife database [45] to conduct our experiment.
7.1 Dataset Description
This database is a GPS trajectory dataset collected by Microsoft
Research Asia over three years by 182 users. During this project,
a wide range of users’ outdoor movements are recorded, including
daily life routines like commuting to work, and activities such
as shopping, dining, and cycling. The users’ movements in this
dataset are represented by a series of tuples containing latitude,
longitude, and timestamps. The dataset contains mobility traces
with the total number of 25 million locations, however, the
variance of the number of locations per user and the total duration
of the trajectories are very high. In our experiment, we have
filtered the dataset to keep only users’ trajectories with more than
500 locations and a duration of at least 1 year. After this process,
the final dataset contains 18 users’ data, and among them, we
picked the user #114 who has a large set of mobility traces.
7.2 MDP Construction Process
The MDP construction algorithm is depicted in Algorithm 1. We
first extract the user’s POIs from his mobility traces by adapt-
ing the clustering algorithm called Density-Joinable cluster (DJ-
Cluster) [46] for our experiment. Following this method, a user’s
POI is defined by the centroid of an area where the user frequently
visits and spends a given amount of time. The maximum diameter
of this area, denoted by MaxRadi, the minimum duration of stay
in this area, denoted by MinStay, and the maximum distance
between the areas, denoted by MinDist, are required parameters
to characterize the user’s POIs.
DJ-Cluster algorithm has three phases. The first phase is to
preprocess the user’s mobility traces to extract the stationary
points. Given a predefined constant MinSpeed ≥ 0, we delete all
the traces in which the user’s speed is greater than MinSpeed. The
second phase is to construct a set of clusters from the remaining
mobility traces and then merge the user’s locations which are
in MaxRadi radius of the clusters’ centroid. The third phase
is to merge the computed clusters in which their centroid are
within MinDist distance. Once, the clustering process is finalized,
for each cluster c, we compute the user spending time in each
cluster in hours, and denote it by stay(c). Given a predefined
positive constant MinStay > 0, we remove any cluster c in which
stay(c) < MinStay. The remaining clusters form the user’s POIs
that represented by the states set S in the MDP M . The described
procedure is shown in the first part of the Algorithm 1 (lines 1-4).
Figure 5 illustrates the user mobility traces. We set
MinSpeed = 0 to extract user stationary points, and use ortho-
dromic distance to compute the distance between the stationary
points to form a cluster. The extracted POIs are shown in Fig-
ure 5 with red marks representing the centroid of each cluster.
Without loss of generality, here we assume the initial distribution
p0(s1) = 1, otherwise p0(s) = 0.
The next is to define the MDP actions set A. As it is discussed
in Section 3.2, we consider the location releasing mechanisms as a
set of actions. Here, we use spatial cloaking techniques to conceal
the user’s POIs. In particular, we utilize the k−area cloaking
method proposed in [19]. This technique provide location privacy
by blending the user secrete location into a region that covers at
least k − 1 other sensitive areas. Thus, the user’s secret location
at each POI area becomes indistinguishable among other k POIs.
Here, we consider all the extracted POIs are potentially sensitive
areas. For a sake of simplicity, we set k = 2, and consider a
curricular cloaking area. Following k−area cloaking method [19],
for any POI s ∈ S, we construct a cloaked region a, with radius ra,
such that it contains s, and at least another POI s′ ∈ S. The k−area
cloaking method iterates over each POI to find the smallest ra that
meets the 2−area cloaking privacy requirement. Figure 5 illustrates
the constructed cloaked areas for two POIs that are represented by
blue circles. The POIs extracted from the user mobility traces are
considered as the user’s true location and are not accessible by the
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Algorithm 1: MDP construction algorithm.
Input: MinSpeed > 0,MinDist > 0,MinStay >
0,MaxRadi > 0,MinDist > 0, k.
Result: User mobility MDP M = (S,A,T, p0, u)
1 Delete all the traces that user’s speed > MinSpeed, and store
the stationary points at StPoint set.
2 Merge all points in StPoint which are in MaxRadi distance
of each other and store as a cluster set C.
3 Merge any pair of clusters c, c′ ∈ C which their distance is
dist(c, c′) < MinDist.
4 Compute user spending time, stay(c), for each cluster c ∈ C,
and remove all the clusters which stay(c) < MinStay, and
store C as the state set S.
5 Set the initial distribution p0(s).
6 For all si ∈ S, construct a cloaked region ai with radius rai
such that the k-area clocking criteria is met [19]. Store all
ai in set A.
7 For any pair of states si, sj ∈ S, compute the transition
probability pij .
8 For any cloaked region al ∈ A, and any pair of states
si, sj ∈ S, compute the MDP transition probability by:
T (si, al, sj) = ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩pij if si ∈ al0 otherwise,
where si ∈ al means the all the points of cluster si are
inside the cloaked region al.
9 For any state s ∈ S, and cloaked region a ∈ A, compute the
quality loss function as u(s, a) = Area(a)Area(s) , if s ∈ a, and
otherwise set u(s, a) = u.
adversary. The cloaking areas however, represent the user’s service
query and hence are observable to the adversary. Given any pairs
of si, sj ∈ S, and a cloaked region a ∈ A, the transition probability
T (si, a, sj) can be interpreted as the probability that the user
reports area a to the LBS, and transits from si to sj . Following
[46], we first compute pij = Prob [sj ∣ si] as the frequency of the
user traveling from si to sj , i.e. pij = nijNi , where Ni is the total
number of time the user traveled from state si, and nij is number
of time the user has traveled from si to sj . Then, for any a ∈ A,
and si, sj ∈ S, we define T (si, a, sj) = pij if the cloaking area a
conceals si, and otherwise T (si, a, sj) = 0.
The quality loss function for this model is associated with the
area of the cloaked regions. More precisely, we assume the user
is querying for information only when he is inside the POIs area,
and the k−area cloaking mechanism obfuscates the user’s location
in the query by increasing the area of retrieval. Hence the user’s
quality of service is expected to degrade proportionally with the
area of the reported cloaked region [31]. Therefore, for any POI s,
and a cloaked region a ∈ A, the utility function can be defined by
u(s, a) = Area(a)Area(s) . Note that, if a is not available at s, the LPPM
policy must avoid reporting a when the user is inside s, and hence,
we set u(s, a) = u, where u >> maxs,a(u(s, a)) representing
a large quality loss. The described procedure is depicted in the
second part of the Algorithm 1 (lines 5-9).
7.3 Simulation with Real-world Dataset
The constructed MDP has 19 states, and 19 actions, and all the
states respect k−area cloaking privacy requirement [19]. We found
one of the user’s extracted POI is nearby a bank, labeled by s12,
and another one is nearby a bus station, labeled by s8. We consider
them as the user’s secret POIs, and therefore, we define Ss ={s8, s12}. We assume the adversary knows the user’s mobility
model M , and maintains a prior belief over the user’s POIs. The
adversary observes the reported cloaked areas and uses inference
model (1) to infer the user presence at Ss. Quantify by −privacy
metric (8), the LPPM protects user privacy by randomizing the
selection of cloaked regions to suppress the adversary belief on
Ss.
Our objective here is to evaluate the privacy level and the
expected total quality loss when the user incorporates the policy
µ in his location releasing mechanism. Let’s consider  = 0.16
as the desired privacy level, and denote bt(Ss) = ∑s∈Ss bt(s).
In order to demonstrate the adversary can improve his knowledge
over the user’s secrete locations, we set b0(s) = 0 for all s ∈ Ss,
and b0(s) = 1/∣S −Ss∣ for any s ∈ {S −Ss}, which also indicates
Asb0 < .
We first design a policy that minimizes the user’s average
quality loss vµ without considering the −privacy requirement.
In particular, we use our proposed LP (29) without −privacy
constraint (8). As it can be seen in Figure 6, although initially M
is −private, the adversary belief over secret state Ss, increases
over time and eventually violates the desired −privacy condition.
Intuitively, the adversary becomes more confident over the user
presence at the area of Ss, although all the user’s POIs are
concealed individually with the cloaking regions. The average
quality loss associated with this policy is vµ = 67.72. We then
synthesize the privacy-preserving policy using LP (29) with the
privacy level  = 0.16. Demonstrated by Figure 6, the LPPM
can suppress the adversary belief to meet the desired privacy
level. This level of user privacy, however, comes with a price.
The average quality loss has increased to vµ = 107.03 when
the user uses the privacy-preserving policy. To further illustrate
this trade-off, let’s define the user’s quality loss at time t by
vˆµ(t) = ∑s,a pt(s)µ(s, a)u(s, a). Figures 7 shows how vˆµ(t)
evolves over time for different policies. As it is depicted in
Figures 6 and 7, although the proposed LPPM can suppress the
adversary belief over the secret locations, the user continuously
receives lower quality of service when the privacy-privacy policy
is incorporated in the LPPM.
Now let’s consider a scenario that the adversary prior belief
violates the −privacy condition, implying the adversary back-
ground knowledge over the user presence at Ss is unsafe. In this
case, the LPPM can still deceive the adversary by manipulating
her belief over secrete locations to eventually satisfy the defined
−privacy criteria. Let’s assume the adversary prior belief over
the user’s secret POIs is ∑s∈Ss b0(s) = 0.2, and for other POIs
s′ ∈ {S − Ss}, is defined as b0(s′) = 0.8/∣S − Ss∣, indicating the
violation of defined −privacy, i.e.,Asb0 /≤ . The LPPM objective
here is to design the policy µ that forces the adversary belief bt
to meet the asymptotic −privacy requirement (31). To achieve
this, we synthesize µ using the proposed BMI given by (33). The
trajectory of bt(Ss), and the associated vˆµ(t) are respectively
shown in Figure 6 and 7. As it is demonstrated, although the
adversary prior belief violates the −privacy condition, the LPPM
can deceive the adversary by gradually suppressing his belief over
the user’s secrete POIs bt(Ss), and asymptotically satisfies the
desired −privacy requirement.
The proposed privacy-preserving policy synthesis is simulated
in MATLAB on a PC with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8650 CPU
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Fig. 5. Example of real-world mobility traces of
a mobile user. The solid black line represents
the traces of user movements, the red marks
are the extracted POIs, and the blue circles are
examples of the cloaked areas.
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Fig. 6. The dashed line represents . Respec-
tively, the blue dash-dot, black solid, the purple
plus-sign lines represent bt(Ss) for the optimal
policy µ, that provides the best utility without
considering −privacy, and µ that guarantees
−privacy, and asymptotic −privacy require-
ments.
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Fig. 7. Respectively, the blue dash-dot, black
solid, the purple plus-sign lines represent vˆµ(t)
for the optimal policy µ, that provides the mini-
mum quality loss without considering −privacy
requirement, and µ that guarantees −privacy,
and asymptotic −privacy requirements.
1.9GHz 16GB RAM running on Windows 10 professional OS.
Finding the optimal −privacy LPPM, expressed as a LP (29), took
0.46 second, and synthesis of the optimal asymptotic −privacy
LPPM, given as a BMI problem (33), took 29.53 seconds.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed and demonstrated a model-
based privacy-preserving framework that guarantees a user-defined
privacy requirement for an infinite time horizon while minimizing
the quality loss of service received by the user. In this regard, a
MDP is constructed to capture the user mobility pattern and the
LBS utility model. Given the MDP with state representing the
user’s locations, we adapt the probabilistic current-state opacity
notion to introduce new location privacy notion, −privacy, which
characterizes the user privacy against a Bayesian adversary with
localization attack model. Through this setup, we illustrated that
even if each user location is concealed from the adversary, she
still can utilize the user mobility model to further reduce his
uncertainty over the user’s secret locations. Given this privacy
concern, we developed a LPPM that randomizes the obfuscation
mechanisms to protect user privacy against the adversary with such
an inference capability. The overall privacy-preserving framework
is demonstrated and validated on an experimental dataset.
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